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statute of limitations, a policy which seeks by the shorter five-year
provision to prevent the bringing of actions upon stale claims
difficult of proof except by parol evidence. On the other hand,
where the implication is not one of oral proof but rather a hard
and fast statutory warranty, the longer ten-year period achieves
fairness as between the parties without opening the door to
fraudulent claims.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES -

ING THE FLOW -

RAILWAY BRIDGE AS OBSTRUCT-

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM UNUSUAL

FLOOD. - In 1903 a railway company constructed a bridge across
a creek, which structure proved insufficient to accommodate the
floods of June 28 and July 11, 1932. As a result the lands above
the obstruction were overflowed and damaged. Similar floods had
occurred in 1861 and 1916. Held, that the instruction" given
was not a basis for reversible error in view of other instructions
granted in defendant's behalf clearly defining its duty. Mitchtell
V. Virginian Ry. Co.2
Liability for damages resulting from flood waters has become
a peculiarly appropriate topic in view of contemporary circumstances.
In all cases the first question in determining legal
liability for damages resulting from obstructing the flow of a
watercourse is whether the defendant was negligent. This is settled by applying the ordinary test of negligence, that is, whether
a man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances would have
foreseen harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's act.
To be free from negligence, the defendant must guard against such
' The lower court, in its first instruction, told the jury, in substance, that
the railway company had the duty in constructing the bridge "1to provide
for such unusual or extraordinary floods, as it should have been anticipated
occasionally would occur in the future, because such unusual or extraordinary
floods may/ have occurred in the past", and if an unprecedented flood occurred in 1916, and the bridge "caused such an obstruction that th lands
above the same were overflowed by water", the railway company then had
the duty to provide for such conditions thus established by said flood; and
if "Ian unusual, extraordinary flood"I came on June 28, 1932, "1which caused
the bridge to be obstructed" and the waters to injure the plaintiff's lands,
"the duty then arose to meet the new conditions thus established", and if
"by reason of past occurrences the flood of July 11, 1932, was in reasonable
contemplation and should have been anticipated and guarded against by the
Railroad Company, in the exercise of reasonable care and that they had the
time and opportunity to do so", then the plaintiffs are entitled to damages
sustained by them, either from the flood of June 28, 1932, or the flood !ofJuly
11, 1932, or from both.
2 183 S. E. 35 (W. Va. 1935).
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floods as are foreseeable, bearing in mind previous known floods
at that place, the nature and extent of the obstruction created, the
physical features of the land, such as the area and contour of the
land drained, and the capacity of the watercourse obstructed, and
other controlling circumstances. If defendant's conduct has not
been negligent and not illegal per se, he cannot be held liable for
the consequences of an unforeseeable flood even though it would
have caused no harm to the plaintiff but for the obstruction which
defendant had created. When a foreseeable flood occurs, which
causes injury to the plaintiff, because of the defendants obstruction,
the defendant is negligent and liable. Where the unforeseeable act
of God in the form of a flood would have caused all of the damage
suffered, irrespective of defendant's negligent act, the American
cases seem to be uniform in holding that the defendant is not
liable. Where only a part of the damage would have been caused
independent of defendant's negligence, the defendant is not liable
to the extent that the damage may be attributed solely to the act
of God. Where the unforeseeable flood of itself would not have
damaged the plaintiff, yet combined with defendant's obstruction,
it produces some harm or greater harm than a foreseeable flood
would have produced, if the damages are not greater due to the
magnitude of the flood than they would otherwise have been, the
defendant is liable for the entire damage. Where the unforeseeable
act of God increases the amount of the plaintiff's damages, it seems
that defendant, as in the situation previously noted, should not be
liable for the increased damages.'
It is submitted that the instruction in the principal case would
in effect require the railway company to provide for extraordinary
floods which are not foreseeable. It is well settled, and admitted in
this case, that the railway company's liability does not extend so
far. Thd jury was instructed that if an unprecedented flood
occurred in 1916, or if an unusually extraordinary flood came
on June 28, 1932, the duty then arose to meet the new conditions.
This apparently ignores the fact that either of these floods may
have been so extraordinary as to be classed as an act of God; and
if so, it does not seem that the railway company should be required
to provide for another flood of the same volume untii such floods
had become so frequent as to warn those living in the vicinity
a Summary of an editorial note wherein the cases supporting these statements may be found: Jones, Liability for Damages Resulting from an Un.
foreseeable Flood (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 139.
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that they might occur at any time.4 Furthermore, the defendant's
duty of care should be measured by what has happened in the past
and not by what may have happened; nor ought the fact that the
flood of July 11, 1932, should have been anticipated entitle the
plaintiffs to damages sustained by the flood .of June 28, 1932." In
these respects it seems that the instruction given was clearly misleading and prejudicial, especially since it was the first instruction
given. Even though other instructions were given which clearly
defined the defendant's duty, they being in conflict with this one,
the verdict should be set aside, for it cannot be told by which instruction the jury was controlled.8 This duty is very burdensome
even under the clearest instructions, so the jury should not be
the least confused in reaching a verdict.
4 (1920) 27 R. C. L. 1107; Note (1907)
iEN',

6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252; RESTATE-

TOnTS (1934) § 302f.

GSee the strong dissenting opinion by Kenna, J., concurred in by Hatcher,
J., in Mitchell v. Virginian Ry. Co., supra n. 2.
6BURKs, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1934) § 263; Note (1906) 2 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 309; (1916) 14 R. C. L. 777.
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